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Information Security Risk Assessment in the Context of Outsourcing in a 
Financial Institution 
Abstract: 
Information security risk assessment in a financial institution is important for understanding 
risk exposure to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets. Third-party security 
is recognized to have a growing importance for financial sector organizations. A financial 
institution aims for securing information while justifying budgeting decisions. Unfortu-
nately, commonly used methods are dependent on value judgements and individual assur-
ances which limit their reflection of existing uncertainties in reality. This is a problem be-
cause organizations do not want to allocate resources into security without accurately esti-
mating their exposure to risks. The paper introduces two information security risk assess-
ment methods: Information System Security Risk Management method and Bayesian Net-
works Based Attack Graphs. A systematic comparison of the methods is made in the context 
of third-party outsourcing. A proposition of how to combine a security risk management 
method together with a probabilistic risk assessment method has been made. Feedback and 
validation have been given by experts in the field. 
Keywords: 
Information security risk assessment, ISSRM, Bayesian Network, Attack graph, Financial 
institutions, Outsourcing 
CERCS: T120 Systems engineering, computer technology 
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Infoturbe riskijuhtimine finantsettevõttes 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Infoturbe riskihindamine finantsinstitutsioonis on oluline, et mõista ettevõtte varade 
konfidentsiaalsuse, tervikluse ja käideldavuse riskipositsiooni. Kolmandate osapooltega 
seotud riskide olulisus on finantsinstitutsioonide jaoks kasvanud. Ettevõtete soov on tagada 
informatsiooni turvalisus optimeerides samal ajal efektiivselt investeeringuid. Täna on 
valdavalt kasutusel meetodid, mis tuginevad ekspertide arvamustele ja individuaalsetele 
hinnangutele, mistõttu kajastavad tulemused vaid limiteeritud vaadet eksisteerivatele 
riskidele. See on probleem, sest ettevõtted ei soovi teha suure mahulisi investeeringuid 
turvalisusesse ilma võimalikult täpselt riske hindamata. Käesolevas uurimistöös on 
käsitletud kahte infoturbe riski hindamise meetodit: ISSRM ja Bayesi võrkudel põhinevat 
ründepuud. Käsitledes kolmandate osapooltega seotud allhanget kui äriprotsessi, on 
koostatud süsteemne võrdlus nende meetodite kohta ning hinnatud allhanke korral tekkida 
võiva riski suurust organisatsioonile. Pakutud on soovitused, kuidas ühendada infoturbe 
riskijuhtimise metoodika tõenäosusliku riskihindamise metoodikaga. Tulemused on 
hinnatud valdkonna spetsialistide poolt. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Infoturbe riski hindamine, Finantsinstitutsioonid, ISSRM, Bayesi võrgud, Ründepuu 
CERCS: T120 Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia 
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1 Introduction	
The past few decades have been leading the way of extensive use of and dependence on 
information communication technology and exponential growth of new data. According to 
the International Telecommunication Union [1] [2], the total amount of Internet users has 
increased from 23% to 51% of the whole population during the last ten years. International 
Data Corporation (IDC) [3] estimates that by 2025 the global amount of data will grow 
about ten times bigger compared with the amount of data that was generated in 2018. While 
a significant increase in the use of technology and information has introduced new opportu-
nities, such changes in society bring non-traditional risks to organizations and individuals 
[4]. In the 1950s, it was suggested that it is not enough for an organization to do investment 
decisions purely using the average return of investment, but risks should also be considered 
[5]. Although this revolutionary way of thinking was first established in the portfolio invest-
ment field, now this principle is also generalized to other areas. 
The research work illustrates how information security risk assessment methods can be ap-
plied in the outsourcing system of a financial institution. Risk assessment is part of risk 
management. The process consists of risk identification, analysis, and evaluation according 
to the ISO 31000:2018 standard [6]. Information security risk assessment should be con-
ducted to “identify risks associated with the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
for information within the scope of the information security management system” [7]. Two 
methods – Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) [8] and Bayesian Net-
work Based Attack Graph (BNBAG) [9] [10] – are used to assess the information security 
risk. ISSRM represents a security risk management method and BNBAG has the character-
istics of a probabilistic risk assessment method. Both methods are used to assess the infor-
mation security risk of outsourcing system. Outsourcing is defined as “the regulated entity’s 
use of a third party [– – –] to perform activities on a continuing basis that would normally 
be undertaken by the regulated entity, now or in the future” [11]. The assets of outsourcing 
are defined, threats, vulnerabilities, and impact analysed, and risk assessed. A financial in-
stitution has contributed to the research to assess their information security risk of outsourc-
ing system. 
Industry sector organizations, including financial institutions, want to pursue their business 
ambitions while operating in a secure environment. Hence, the information security risk to 
the organization has to be assessed. In addition to securing their own information systems, 
where financial institutions have already made significant investments, risk arising from 
third-party security is recognized to have a growing importance for financial sector organi-
zations [12]. The volume of outsourcing is growing which gives an opportunity for the threat 
to target vulnerabilities in shared banking systems and third-party networks [12]. Today, 
financial institutions use qualitative security risk management methods which take value 
judgements as input to the analysis [13]. It saves time, effort, and expenses [14]. However, 
most of the methods rely on subjective judgment, focus on concepts and principles, and do 
not provide monetary values [9]. Alternatively, the use of quantitative probabilistic risk as-
sessment methods, which use measured data as input to limit subjectivity of the analysis, 
can be considered. However, the process of gathering data and managing it requires more 
time and effort [13]. The third possibility is to combine the two together into a hybrid 
method, which allows the use of subjective and measured data as input while optimizing 
time, effort and expenses [14].  
As security risk management methods and probabilistic risk assessment methods have lim-
itations to consider, enhancements to the information security risk assessment methods are 
required. The developed method should combine the benefits of both methods while 
10 
 
reducing their limitations. It should include the identification of assets that need protection, 
coherent analysis of threats, incorporation of dependencies between information system vul-
nerabilities, and defined impact. The aim of comprehensive and accurate risk assessment is 
the optimal allocation of limited resources for efficient risk reduction. The following ques-
tion is the main research question proposed as the purpose of this research paper. It is de-
veloped further into the four research questions. 
How to combine security risk management and probabilistic risk assessment methods? 
Research question 1: What are the assets that need protection? Asset identification is the 
primary task when assessing information security risk. An answer to this question defines 
the context of the study and identifies the relevant assets that need protection. ISSRM [8] 
method is used to scope the assets. 
Research question 2: What is the estimated information security risk? An answer to this 
question shows the information security risk assessment process. Risk is assessed using the 
defined assets in Research question 1. ISSRM method [8] is chosen as an example of secu-
rity risk management method and BNBAG [9] [10] approach as an example of a probabil-
istic risk assessment method. 
Research question 3: What is the comparison of the chosen risk assessment methods? An 
answer to this question shows the difference between assessing risk using security risk man-
agement method or probabilistic risk assessment method. The assessment results from Re-
search question 2 have been compared. 
Research question 4: How can security risk management method and probabilistic risk as-
sessment method be used together? An answer proposes a list of steps to combine a security 
risk management method with a probabilistic risk assessment method to address the chal-
lenging parts of risk assessment processes. 
Questions 1 – 3 are answered using an outsourcing scenario proposed by the financial insti-
tution. Research questions 1 – 4 provide understanding about combining security risk as-
sessment methodology with probabilistic risk assessment method for improved results, 
highlighting potential benefits, limitations and necessary prerequisites. 
The academic literature presents a coherent overview of information security risk assess-
ment methods. Despite that, relevant contribution to the existing literature has been made. 
Firstly, assets that need protection in an outsourcing system have been identified. Secondly, 
two applicable methods, both different in nature, have been used to assess the risk of out-
sourcing system for the financial institution.  Thirdly, a comparison of the assessment meth-
ods has been represented. A proposition of how to combine a security risk management 
method together with a probabilistic risk assessment method has been made. Feedback and 
validation of the research work have been given by the experts from the financial institution. 
The structure of the research paper is represented as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction 
of the scope, research problem, research questions, and contribution of the author; Chapter 
2 is the theoretical overview of information security risk assessment methods; Chapter 3 is 
the case study description of outsourcing system in the financial institution; Chapter 4 is the 
information risk assessment using ISSRM method; Chapter 5 is the information risk assess-
ment using BNBAG method; Chapter 6 is a discussion of the results; and Chapter 7 is the 
conclusion of the research paper. 
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2 Theoretical	Framework	
This chapter focuses on the state of the art of information security risk assessment. An over-
view of the existing risk management standards is introduced. Two methods – ISSRM and 
BNBAG – are described in detail as they are the focus of this research paper. The processes 
of gathering data, methods for calculating the result and the meaning of the results of these 
methods are explained. A comparison of these methods is included to map the similarities 
and differences between the two methods. 
2.1 Information	Security	Risk	Management	Standards	and	Frameworks	
There is a number of information security risk management standards and frameworks avail-
able for organizations to use. Firstly, ISO/IEC 27005 [15], which is one of the ISO/IEC 
2700x standards [16], is an information security risk management standard. Risk assessment 
consists of risk identification, analysis, and evaluation [7]. 
Secondly, NIST has developed their information risk management standard named NIST 
800-30 “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems” [17]. It is known 
for its flexibility; therefore, it has been adopted by a number of organizations. 
There are other risk assessment standards and frameworks available, e.g. FAIR approach 
[18], OCTAVE Allegro framework [19], COSO framework [20]. Regardless, ISO/IEC 
27005 and NIST 800-30 are the most famous ones. 
The research focuses on information security risk assessment in a financial institution. After 
having reviewed the relevant literature, there is no specific information security risk man-
agement standard or framework for financial institutions. Financial Sector Advisory Centre 
of World Bank [21] has issued a document listing a number of relevant financial sector 
specific documents that stress the issues of security risk assessment and offer guidelines. 
Classification of Information Security Risk Assessment Methods 
An information security risk assessment method should have the characteristics that de-
scribe each one of the following four classes [14]: 
1. Qualitative, quantitative, or hybrid – different in their input and output requirements. 
2. Asset-driven, service-driven, or business-driven – a different level of organization 
is being focused on. 
3. Horizontal or vertical – different in their resource valuation. 
4. Non-propagated or propagated – different in their attack propagation approach. 
ISSRM and BNBAG methods have been mapped using the categorization to make them 
comparable with other methods. The results are shown in Table 4. 
2.2 Information	Systems	Security	Risk	Management	Method	
ISSRM method [8] is an information security risk management method. It helps to under-
stand which assets are valuable and need protection against certain threats. Also, it intro-
duces risk treatment options by proposed security countermeasures. It offers a domain 
model, metrics and process for managing risk. The first reason why ISSRM has been chosen 
is due to its qualitative nature which is different from the other method. The second reason 
is due to its similarity to Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2 (IRAM 2). Initially, 
IRAM 2 was considered to be analysed because it has been used in the financial institution 
before. Unfortunately, the author of the thesis was not able to get permission from the In-
formation Security Forum to use their method. ISSRM has similar characteristics and ele-
ments compared with IRAM 2, therefore, it is a suitable alternative to use. 
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2.2.1 Domain	Model	
The ISSRM domain model [8] has been developed through a survey of security risk man-
agement standards and methods. The domain model for ISSRM, presented in Figure 1., has 
three groups of concepts: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts, and risk-treatment 
related concepts which are marked accordingly with yellow, red and green. The current sec-
tion and the following two sections are based on the research by Dubois et al. [8]. 
 
Figure 1. ISSRM domain model (adapted from [11]) 
Asset-related concepts emphasize which assets are important to be protected according to 
the security needs of the system. Assets are either business assets or information system (IS) 
assets. A business asset is any information, process or skill that is necessary for an organi-
zation to achieve its business objectives. It is characterized by the security criterion of con-
fidentiality, availability, or integrity. Information system assets are valuable parts of IS be-
cause they provide support for business assets.  
The second group is risk-related concepts which illustrate risk and its components. Risk is 
described as a threat that could exploit one or more vulnerabilities, leading to an impact that 
harms two or more assets and negates the security criterion. A threat is a combination of a 
threat agent and attack method.  
Risk treatment-related concepts describe how to treat risk based on the knowledge of exist-
ing controls that implement security requirements which mitigate risk. Risk treatment is the 
decision whether to avoid, reduce, transfer or retain the risk. Risk treatment-related concepts 
are not part of the scope of the thesis. 
2.2.2 Metrics	
ISSRM method [8] offers several metrics. Firstly, the value metric describes the value of a 
business asset considering the potential impact if the business asset is either disclosed, mod-
ified or disrupted. Secondly, the security need metric expresses the importance of the secu-
rity criterion with respect to the business asset. These two metrics describe asset-related 
concepts. 
Thirdly, the likelihood metric describes the likelihood of an attack considering the adver-
sary’s motivation and attack method sophistication. Vulnerability level metric describes the 
prevalence of the vulnerability and the likelihood of exploit. Potentiality is calculated using 
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the likelihood and vulnerability level metrics represented in Equation 1. Impact level metric 
is the maximum value that is assigned to the security need metric. 
Potentiality = Likelihood + Vulnerability - 1    (1) 
Risk level metric is calculated as the product of potentiality and impact level. It is calculated 
according to Equation 2. These five metrics describe risk-related concepts. 
Risk level = Potentiality × Impact    (2) 
In risk treatment-related concepts, risk treatment and security requirements are estimated 
using risk reduction and cost. Controls are estimated in terms 
of cost. These metrics are not used in the case study part of 
the thesis. 
2.2.3 ISSRM	Process	
The process of ISSRM [8] introduces the activities to conduct 
information security risk management. The overall process is 
presented in Figure 4. It begins with understanding the con-
text where the organization is operating and identifying its 
business and IS assets. The next step is to determine the se-
curity objectives in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability based on the level of protection needed for the 
assets. Then the risk is analyzed and assessed. After these 
activities, it is decided whether the assessment is satisfying 
or not. These previous steps can be iterated in case of unsat-
isfying results. 
The following step is about risk treatment whether to avoid, 
reduce, transfer, or accept the risk. Then security require-
ments are to be defined to state the needed security conditions 
to achieve the desired level of security based on identified 
risks. If the treatment has been unsatisfying, then the whole 
process can be started from the beginning or from risk treat-
ment step. The last step is about selecting and implementing 
controls based on security requirements. 
The first three steps form risk assessment; thus, they are con-
sidered in the case study of the thesis. Risk treatment, secu-
rity requirement definitions, and controls are left out of the 
research. 
Modelling threats and vulnerabilities 
Part of ISSRM process is risk analysis and assessment. 
ISSRM method considers the risk to be the successful exploit 
of a vulnerability by a threat leading to an impact which 
harms an asset and negates the security criterion according to 
the domain model. Therefore, threats and vulnerabilities have 
been modelled.  
Threats can be modelled following a taxonomy, e.g. MI-
TRE’s ATT&CK taxonomy [22]; Threat Agent Library by 
Intel Corporation [23], or some other. The chosen taxonomy 
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Figure 2. ISSRM process 
(adapted from [11]) 
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is issued by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 
[24] as it categorizes threats similar to the categorization in IRAM 2. As noted, the author 
was not able to get permission from ISF to use IRAM 2 which has been used in the financial 
institution before. ENISA taxonomy categorizes threats into the following classes [24]: 
1. Unintentional damage, which refers to the loss of confidentiality, integrity or avail-
ability of assets due to mistakes or errors. 
2. A disaster which occurs due to natural or environmental forces. 
3. Failures or malfunction which occurs without somebody causing them. 
4. Outages which occur due to unavailability of resources without them being attacked. 
5. Intentional physical attack, which refers to the physical damage on assets by humans. 
6. Nefarious activity which indicates any malicious or abusive activity towards infor-
mation systems. 
7. Interception which is a deliberate attack against the information system to alter com-
munication. 
Secondly, there are lists of vulnerabilities available, e.g. MITRE Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures [25], or NIST National Vulnerability Database repository [26]. The chosen 
taxonomy to model vulnerabilities is OWASP Top 10 (2017) as it has been used by the 
financial institution before. An overview of the OWASP Top 10 categories is presented in 
the following list [27]: 
1. Injection – a threat agent can send malicious code to the interpreter. 
2. Broken authentication – a system has authentication weaknesses in it. 
3. Sensitive data exposure – data is not protected according to the needs. 
4. XML external entities – an application parses xml input. 
5. Broken access control – user of the system can act according to different permissions 
than one is intended to. 
6. Security misconfiguration – threat agent can gain access to the system due to the 
lack of proper configuration. 
7. Cross-Site Scripting – malicious code can be executed by a threat agent in another 
user’s browser. 
8. Insecure deserialization – untrusted user input is used while rebuilding data format 
to an object. 
9. Using components with known vulnerabilities – known vulnerabilities are not 
patched. 
10. Insufficient logging and monitoring – a threat agent can achieve the goal without 
even being detected due to lack of logging and monitoring of systems. 
Certain vulnerabilities have been chosen from the categories and adjusted according to the 
nature of the case study. An overview of the vulnerabilities is provided in Appendix I. 
2.3 Bayesian	Networks	Based	Attack	Graphs	Method	
BNBAG method [9] [10] is a probabilistic risk assessment method. Bayesian Network (BN) 
is used to model and analyse an attack graph. The reason why BNBAG is used as an ap-
proach to model information security risk is its difference from ISSRM model. The financial 
institution about which the research is conducted has expressed their interest in potentially 
evaluating some parts of information security risks quantitatively. As the financial institu-
tion is not able to provide complete data for the analysis, a hybrid method as BNBAG is a 
suitable one. 
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2.3.1 Bayesian	Probability	Theory	
Bayes’ probability theorem provides a version to compute conditional probabilities. Bayes-
ian probabilistic reasoning starts with a hypothesis, H, for which the probability of hypoth-
esis P(H) is called prior belief about H. Evidence, E, is used to revise the belief about H 
using the likelihood of evidence, P(H|E). The posterior belief about H in the light of evi-
dence is calculated [9]. Bayes’ theorem states that the probability of the hypothesis given 
the evidence is equal to the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis times the prob-
ability of hypothesis divided by the probability of evidence [28]. Bayes’ theorem is repre-
sented in the following Equation 3. [28]: !(#|%) = 	 )(*|+)×)(+))(*)     (3) 
where 
P(H) –  prior belief about H, 
P(E) –   probability of evidence, 
P(E|H) –  likelihood of evidence E, 
P(H|E) –  posterior belief about H. 
There are situations where there is no information about P(E), then marginalization, i.e. the 
sum of probabilities of all events, can be used following Equation 4. [9]: !(%) = ∑ !(%,#)/      (4) 
where 
P(E) –   probability of evidence, 
P(E,H) –  probability of evidence and probability of hypothesis. 
Bayes’ theorem allows to renew and change the estimates if new data has been gathered. If 
there is a strong prior belief that some hypothesis is true, then after having gained more data 
that fails to support the hypothesis, Bayes’ theorem will favour the alternative hypothesis 
that better explains the data [9]. 
2.3.2 Attack	Graphs	
An attack graph with a structure of a tree provides a useful framework to represent infor-
mation system vulnerabilities and dependencies between them. An attack graph shows the 
possible attack vectors to compromise a given objective by successfully exploiting vulner-
abilities in sequence [10]. All the vulnerabilities that form the attack vector must be suc-
cessfully exploited. There can be several attack paths through the system to reach the main 
goal.  
Logical attack graphs rely on the monotonicity principle, i.e. once an attacker has gained 
privileges, one will not give them away [10]. Monotonicity introduces DAGs, i.e. there is a 
directed non-circular movement between the structure of nodes [9]. A simple example of a 
DAG graph is presented in Figure 3. The arcs from A to B, from B to D, and from C to D 
mean that there is a directed causal dependence of A on B, and of B on D, and of C on D. 
There cannot be an arc from D to A due to the acyclic structure of the graph. 
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Figure 3. DAG structure example 
The occurrence of an event in the attack tree is modelled probabilistically. These models 
contain one or many parameters, which values are known only with uncertainty [29]. An 
attack graph is categorized as a qualitative model as it considers an information system to 
be either secure or not [30]. 
2.3.3 BNBAG	Process	
BN is the set of variables represented as nodes and the direct dependences 
between the edges of these nodes. It is in the form of a DAG and has a set 
of node probability tables (NPTs) [9]. The process of assessing infor-
mation security risks with BNBAG is represented in Figure 4. It consists 
of the following steps: (1) identification of the possible set of vulnerabil-
ities  in the system; (2) creation of the vulnerability nodes, i.e. and di-
rected arcs between the nodes where an occurrence of an exploit is con-
ditioned on the exploit of the previous one; (3) specification of the NPT 
for each vulnerability node; (4) reasoning and calculation. 
The steps of (1) identification of vulnerabilities and (2) the creation of 
directed arcs between them have been done following the OWASP Top 
10 taxonomy introduced in the ISSRM process description in Section 
2.2.3. Overview of the vulnerabilities is presented in Appendix I.  
The third step is about NPTs. The NPT is a table of probabilities that 
represent the probability distribution of the node given its parents [9]. 
NPTs incorporate the conditional probability distribution which is the in-
formation about each node in the BNBAG.  is a node, represents the par-
ent node(s), and is the probability of a node becoming successful given 
the state of its parent node(s)  [10]. According to Figure 3., a NPT of D is 
the probability distribution of D given the set of parents of D which are 
B and C; a NPT of B is the probability distribution of B given its parent 
A. If a node does not have parents, the NPT is simply the probability 
distribution of that node. In Figure 3., node A and node C do not have any 
parents therefore the NPT of A is the probability distribution of A and the 
NPT of C is the probability distribution of C. Any pair of variables that 
are not connected to each other indicate independence between them. 
The fourth step is about calculating the result. In risk assessment, an 
incident can happen only if one or more vulnerabilities are exploited. 
A
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C
(1)	Identification	of
vulnerabilities
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vulnerability	nodes
and	directed	arcs
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Figure 4. 
BNBAG process 
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Equation 5. indicates that if an incident is true given that the vulnerability is true, then it 
equals to the probability of the vulnerability. Equation 6. indicates that if there are no vul-
nerabilities in the system, then there is no incident. Equation 7. indicates that if there is an 
exploit of the vulnerability, then there could potentially be no incident. Equation 8. indicates 
that if there are no vulnerabilities, then there are no incidents. To calculate the NPT for an 
incident, the following Equations 6 to 9 are used inside the NPT cells: 
P(Incident=T|Vulnerability=T)=P(Vulnerability)  (5) 
P(Incident=T|Vulnerability=F)=0    (6) 
P(Incident=F|Vulnerability=T)=1-P(Vulnerability)  (7) 
P(Incident=F|Vulnerability=F)=1    (8) 
Therefore, the probability of an incident in the system is the probability that at least one of 
the vulnerabilities becomes exploited. Equation 9. describes the probability of an incident: 
P(Incident=T)=1	-∏P(vulnerabilities=F)   (9) 
A BN can be constructed qualitatively, automatically from data, or using a combination of 
them both. The construction of attack graphs and calculations can be labour-intensive as it 
requires a lot of skill, expertise, and creativity. Also, the communication between the experts 
needs to be intense and productive [31]. It is positive that once the construction is ready, the 
BN parameters can be continuously updated as new information arrives. 
2.4 Comparison	of	ISSRM	and	BNBAG	
ISSRM and BNBAG methods have similarities and differences in their process of assessing 
risk, concepts that are being used, the purpose and variables. Three tables are made to de-
scribe this information and give an overview. Table 1. is made to compare the methods in 
the context of their process, according to Figure 2. and Figure 4. 
Table 1. Comparison of the processes of ISSRM and BNBAG 
Process overview ISSRM BNBAG 
Defining the risk as-
sessment scope 
(a) Identifying business and IS assets 
(b) Determining security objectives 
(1) Identifying the vulnerabili-
ties 
Defining the relevant 
threats and potential 
vulnerabilities, calcu-
lating the risk 
(c) Risk analysis and assessment  
(2) Creating the vulnerability 
nodes and the directed arcs 
between the nodes 
(3) Specifying the NPTs 
(4) Reasoning and calculation 
Deciding on the risk 
treatment 
(d) Risk treatment 
(e) Security requirements definition 
- 
  
Implementing rele-
vant controls 
(f) Controls selection and imple-
mentation - 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on the Figure 2. and Figure 4.) 
Notes: 1) the symbol “-“ indicates that this part of the process is not included in the method. 
2) (d), (e), (f) parts of the process are not analysed in the empirical part of the study. 
Firstly, the process of identifying business and IS assets and determining the security objec-
tives in ISSRM are done to scope the relevant assets. BNBAG do not scope assets, instead, 
18 
 
the relevant vulnerabilities are determined which is described by identifying the vulnerabil-
ities. Secondly, risk analysis and assessment are done to determine the relevant threat agents 
and their attack methods that are used to exploit one or many vulnerabilities which leads to 
an impact for the company. The reason for this phase is to calculate the risk level according 
to ISSRM. In BNBAG, the second phase is done by creating the vulnerability nodes, creat-
ing arcs between conditioned attack nodes, specifying the NPSs, and calculating the prob-
ability of an incident. The reason for this phase is to analyse the vulnerabilities to calculate 
the probability of a vulnerability becoming exploited. Although the two methods are fairly 
different in their nature, this mapping is used in the thesis for further analysis.  ISSRM is a 
risk management method, therefore, risk treatment and controls selection are considered as 
part of the process. Risk treatment and defining security requirements steps are taken to 
decide on the risk treatment plans. Also, ISSRM deals with controls selection and imple-
mentation to decide on the relevant controls to implement the security requirements that 
mitigate the risk. As BNBAG is a probabilistic risk assessment method, it does not consider 
risk treatment, security requirements nor controls as part of its process. 
Table 2. represents the comparison between the ISSRM domain model and BNBAG 
method.  
Table 2. Comparison of the models of ISSRM and BNBAG 
Model overview ISSRM BNBAG 
Finding the relevant assets and determining 
their need of security in terms of confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability 
IS asset 
Business asset 
Asset 
Security objective 
Security criterion 
- 
Defining the possible threats agents, their 
attack methods and the probability of a suc-
cessful attack 
Threat agent 
Attack method 
Threat 
Node probability table 
Identifying the vulnerabilities and their de-
pendence on each other Vulnerability 
Vulnerabilities 
Dependencies between 
vulnerabilities 
Defining the probability of a successful at-
tack Event Probability of incident 
Identifying the impact of a possible attack Impact - 
Finding the amount of risk Risk - 
Deciding on the risk treatment options Risk treatment Control - 
Defining the needed security Security requirement - 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on Sections 2.2 and 2.3.) 
Notes: 1) the symbol “-“ indicates that this part of the process is not included in the method; 
2) parts of the model – risk treatment, control, and security requirement – are not 
analysed in the case study. 
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The first part of the domain model of ISSRM consists of IS assets, business assets, which 
together form assets. Also, security objective and security criterion in terms of confidenti-
ality, integrity, and availability are studied. The reason is to describe the relevant IS and 
business assets in terms of their need for confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability 
(A). BNBAG does not include assets and their need for security in terms of C-I-A to be 
analysed.  
A threat in ISSRM is defined as an individual or a group of people with certain attributes, 
e.g. motivation and capability, and their attack method which indicates their actions taken 
to target the IS assets. These two domains are put together which results as a threat. BNBAG 
describes a threat using node probability tables that describe the probability of a vulnerabil-
ity being exploited by an attacker assuming its existence in the system. BNBAG does not 
consider a threat with exact attributes. A vulnerability in ISSRM is a weakness of IS asset 
which can be exploited by a threat. In BNBAG, the focus is on determining the vulnerabil-
ities of the system or process and various dependencies between defined vulnerabilities. An 
event, in ISSRM, is successful exploitation of a vulnerability by a threat. BNBAG describes 
a similar situation with the probability of an incident, which is the probability of successful 
exploitation of the vulnerability.  
BNBAG does not have any other parts in its model to assess information security risk. 
ISSRM domain model is much richer in that sense having a number of components incor-
porated into risk assessment. The impact is the potential result in terms of loss after a suc-
cessful attack. Risk is as an event and its corresponding impact. When the risk is found, it is 
decided how to treat it based on the knowledge of existing controls that implement security 
requirements. 
ISSRM and BNBAG use variables in the process of risk assessment. The comparison of 
variables is presented in Table 3. ISSRM uses the metric of value and security need to de-
termine the value of a business asset in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
BNBAG does not consider asset related metrics. ISSRM uses likelihood to determine the 
probability of a threat. BNBAG does not explicitly use any variables to describe a threat. 
ISSRM uses vulnerability level metric to determine the level of weakness. BNBAG also 
uses vulnerabilities to describe the probability of discovering certain weaknesses in the sys-
tem that could become exploited. ISSRM calculates the potentiality to describe the likeli-
hood of a threat event happening. BNBAG uses probability to estimate the probability of a 
vulnerability becoming exploited by a threat. ISSRM uses impact level to determine the 
impact of a successful threat event. BNBAG does not consider impact calculation as part of 
the risk assessment process. The main goal of ISSRM is to calculate the risk level that de-
scribes the risk. The aim of BNBAG is to calculate the probability of incident that describes 
a probability of an attack against one or many vulnerabilities found in the information sys-
tem that result as a risk to an organization. ISSRM also uses cost and risk reduction metrics 
to describe risk treatment, security requirements, and controls. BNBAG does not consider 
risk treatment and controls as part of it. 
The two methods can be compared in terms of the classification of qualitative, quantitative 
and hybrid approaches and to the taxonomy introduced by Shameli-Sendi et al. [14]. The 
Table 4. has been presented to give a short overview of the classification of ISSRM and 
BNBAG methods introduced in Section 2.1. The distinguishable characteristics that de-
scribe these methods are also presented in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Comparison of the variables of ISSRM and BNBAG 
Description of the variables ISSRM BNBAG 
The value of business and IS assets Value - 
The security need of assets Security need - 
The possible treats, their likelihood 
of initiating a successful attack and 
their strength 
Likelihood - 
The vulnerabilities of the system Vulnerability level Vulnerabilities 
The probability of a successful attack 
against the system Potentiality Probability 
The impact of a successful attack Impact level -  
The amount of risk Risk level Probability of incident 
The cost of risk treatment and the 
amount of risk reduction 
Cost of risk treatment 
Risk reduction due to risk 
treatment 
- 
The cost of security requirements and 
the amount of risk reduction 
Cost of security requirement 
Risk reduction due to security 
requirement 
- 
The cost of controls Cost of control -  
Source: Compiled by the author (based on Sections 2.2 and 2.3) 
Notes: 1) the symbol “-“ indicates that this part of the process is not included in the method. 
2) the metrics – cost of risk treatment, risk reduction due to risk treatment, cost of 
security requirement, risk reduction due to security requirement, cost of control – 
are not analysed in the case study.  
The following paragraphs illustrate how ISSRM and BNBAG fit in the taxonomy proposed 
by Shameli-Sendi et al. [14]. Information security risk assessment appraisements are tradi-
tionally classified as qualitative, quantitative, or hybrid [14]. ISSRM method is a qualitative 
method because it uses subjective judgement values or range variables as input to the anal-
ysis and results in a rank of risks. BNBAG is a hybrid method because it uses either numeric 
or subjective judgement values as input to the analysis and outputs the probability of an 
incident calculated using Bayesian statistics. 
Information security risk assessment can be done in three perspectives classified as asset-
driven, service-driven, or business-driven [14]. Although, these three are the most common 
ones, the author of this research has also proposed a vulnerability-driven perspective. 
ISSRM has the asset-related concept, risk-related concept and risk-treatment-related con-
cept incorporated into the method. Despite that, the main focus in on securing the assets in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. BNBAG is a vulnerability-driven per-
spective as the main focus in on identifying the vulnerabilities and the potential incident 
when one or more vulnerabilities have been exploited. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of ISSRM and BNBAG 
Characteristics ISSRM BNBAG 
Appraisement Qualitative Hybrid 
Input/output Range/rank Non-monetary/non-monetary 
Perspective Asset-driven Vulnerability-driven 
Resource Valuation V(I)+H(I) H(D) 
Risk Measurement Non-propagated Propagated 
Calculation technique Multiplication operation Bayesian network-based attack graph 
Assessment stages (1) RA; (2) RE; (3) RR (1) RA; (2) RE 
Result Risk level Probability of incident 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on the classification by Shameli-Sendi et al. [14]) 
Resource valuation is the phase of risk analysis that defines the value of resources [14]. The 
vertical resource valuation considers the degree of contribution of a resource to upper lev-
els. ISSRM evaluates assets to be independent (V(I)) without contributing to other levels. 
Also, the resources are evaluated independently (H(I)). BNBAG does not consider assets as 
part of the analysis but evaluates resources dependently (H(D)). 
The last step of risk assessment is risk measurement where two types of measurements are 
distinguishable: non-propagated or propagated [14]. ISSRM considers impact only in terms 
of loss in confidentiality, integrity or availability of one asset which is the reason why it is 
a non-propagated type of a method. BNBAG is a propagated type as it uses conditional 
probabilities. It measures a probability of a vulnerability being exploited conditioned on its 
parents being successfully exploited. 
The other characteristics to describe the methods are calculation technique, assessment 
stages, and result. ISSRM uses multiplication operation to calculate the risk as the product 
of impact and likelihood. BNBAG uses Bayesian network-based attack graph to calculate 
the probability of a successful incident. In BNBAG, the risk is a state of uncertainty calcu-
lated by using Bayesian probability theory and the characteristics of an attack graph. Risk 
assessment stages – risk analysis (RA), risk evaluation (RE) and responding to risk (RR) – 
have been described in detail in previous sections. ISSRM method incorporates all the 
stages, while BNBAG does not consider RR. All in all, the result of methods that are rele-
vant to this research are risk level and the probability of an incident. 
2.5 Chapter	Summary	
This chapter introduced the state of the art of information security risk assessment standards, 
frameworks and methods. Firstly, an overview of the information security risk management 
standards and frameworks has been provided. Secondly, a possible classification taxonomy 
of information security risk assessment methods has been presented. The main focus of this 
chapter has been on giving an overview of the ISSRM and BNBAG methods in the context 
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of their processes, domain models and metrics. Information about the data gathering pro-
cesses, result calculation methods, and the meaning of the results has been provided.  
The comparison of ISSRM and BNBAG has been done as a mapping between the relevant 
stages, domain models and metrics of these methods. Also, ISSRM, and BNBAG has been 
compared in the context of the classification taxonomy, which helps to compare them also 
with other methods that are out of the scope of this thesis. The chapter has given an overview 
of the available standards, frameworks and methods that can be used in information security 
risk assessment in an organization.  
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3 Case	Description	
The chapter introduces the case study in the context of a financial institution. The focus is 
on evaluating information security risk that could potentially characterize outsourcing. The 
outsourcing system and its components have been introduced. Also, outsourcing as a busi-
ness process has been modelled and visualized to give an overview of its complexity. 
3.1 Outsourcing	in	Financial	Institutions	
Today it is common for organizations to outsource certain products or services to third-party 
organizations. The reasons to outsource can be different, e.g. getting access to better skills, 
expertise, and technology, inability to provide services internally, wanting to concentrate on 
core business processes, optimizing the use of in-house personnel, reducing cost and im-
proving flexibility [32]. The main problem associated with outsourcing is limited control 
over the services and solutions developed or maintained by a third-party entity [33]. Due to 
the dependence between the outsourcing organization and the third-party entity, the risks 
that the third-party is facing can also have an impact on the outsourcing organization [33]. 
Financial institutions are highly regulated organizations. In Estonia, according to the Emer-
gency Act chapter 5 [34], payment service providers have been listed as vital service pro-
viders which “is a service that has an overwhelming impact on the functioning of society 
and the interruption of which is an immediate threat to the life or health of people or to the 
operation of another vital service or service of general interest” [34]. Financial institutions 
need to comply with rules and regulations. Third-parties are usually unregulated and they 
might not understand the importance of the regulations [35]. According to the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision [11], the financial service provider that wants to outsource 
a number of services and solutions is responsible for managing and monitoring the unregu-
lated party’s activities. The topic of outsourcing in covered in a number of regulations that 
the financial institutions need to follow, e.g. Directive 2014/65/EU known as the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) [36], and the Directive 2015/2366/EU known 
as the Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) [37].  
The services provided by third-party vendors can be classified into the following categories: 
telecommunication, security, data management, software, hardware, automation, and infor-
mation systems services. Telecommunication service vendors are providing WAN network-
ing solutions, SWIFT common components, web site hosting, VoIP, Internet access, and 
data lines. A security service that has been outsourced is a solution to protect the organiza-
tion from DDoS attacks. Some of the data centre related solutions that belong to data man-
agement services have also been outsourced. Software development that has been out-
sourced is mainly associated with mobile application development and integration. Also, 
some software licenses and support has been bought from third-party vendors which include 
telephone systems and cloud services. Likewise, a few other PaaS solutions has been inte-
grated that were developed by a third-party vendor. Technical hardware has been supplied, 
and information systems developed and maintained by third-parties. These are the examples 
of services that are being outsourced. Outsourcing as a business process is described in the 
next sections. 
3.2 Outsourcing	System	and	Its	Components	
Outsourcing is the relationship between the outsourcing entity and the external third-party 
to provide services and solutions that otherwise would be provided by the outsourcing entity 
itself. For the upcoming information security risk analysis, the outsourcing system is defined 
as the collection of the following components: 
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1) Organization employees who are responsible for conducting one or many tasks in 
the context of outsourcing, such as project manager, contract owner, human re-
sources representative, IT specialist, information security manager, purchase com-
mittee, legal counsel, operational risk manager, compliance manager, etc.; 
2) external parties who provide services, or monitor legal and regulatory compliance, 
or protect the interests of employees, such as service providers, Financial Stability 
Authority (FSA), unions; 
3) the infrastructure needed for the communication of the parties, such as email service; 
4) the infrastructure needed to store information, such as contract storage management 
system, and document database; 
5) the information that is exchanged between parties, such as outsourcing agreement, 
risk assessment plan, and many more. 
The overall system of outsourcing is relatively complex. It needs the involvement, collabo-
ration, and communication of a significant number of parties, which is supported by relevant 
infrastructure needs and application. 
3.3 Security	Objectives	of	Outsourcing	
The focus of the thesis is on information security and the importance of maintaining it in the 
context of third-party outsourcing. Information security objectives that need to be ensured 
are described as follows: 
• Confidentiality is maintained when data is protected from unauthorized access. 
• Integrity is maintained when data is accurate, not modified or altered. 
• Availability is maintained when access to data for authorized persons is assured. 
These three objectives are the most common ones that are used. The financial institution has 
no exceptional views in this case. 
3.4 Outsourcing	Business	Process	
The overall business process of outsourcing is illustrated in Figure 5. It is divided into five 
phases, which vary in the amount and complexity of tasks. An overview with a less detailed 
insight into the phases is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 5. Outsourcing phases 
Opportunity Identification is the first phase during which the initial steps are taken to esti-
mate the outsourcing opportunities. A Project manager creates the scope of outsourcing, 
starts its review and forwards it to the legal counsel. The legal counsel reviews the scope, 
decides on its applicability and whether to notify the FSA. If needed, then the FSA is con-
tacted. The FSA forms their response and sends it to the legal counsel who forwards the 
overall applicability answer to the project manager. If the scope is denied, then the project 
manager should renew it. If the scope is applicable, then an indicative project plan and the 
business case should be created. The project manager also develops an initial risk assess-
ment and submits a new product approval process initiation. The last two documents are 
shared with the operational risk or information security manager. 
Pre-Study is the second phase during which a high-level solution for outsourcing is created. 
The project manager sends information to the human resources about the upcoming 
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Implementation
Managing,
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outsourcing. The human resources decide whether to inform the unions about it. If it is de-
cided to inform the unions, then information is sent to them. The project manager also sub-
mits a purchase request and the purchase committee decides whether to proceed or not. If 
the purchase request is approved, then the project manager identifies the application inven-
tory and defines development needs. Support should be asked from the system owner or 
information security manager. Also, the project manager updates the previously created doc-
uments.  
Design & Planning is the third phase, which is divided into the process design phase and 
service provider phase. Process design phase aims for developing a detailed solution for 
outsourcing. In this phase, the project manager starts drafting the outsourcing agreement 
together with the legal counsel. Also, the project manager creates the internal exit and busi-
ness continuity management plan. This is done together with the support from the opera-
tional risk manager. Furthermore, the project manager creates the communication plans to-
gether with the compliance manager that describes if and how the communication with FSA 
will be managed. Also, the project manager updates the previously created documents. Ser-
vice provider phase is important to analyse possible service providers and prepare for the 
next phase. The project manager analyses the possible service providers and sends the pur-
chaser the outsourcing agreement. The purchaser contacts the service providers and intro-
duces the outsourcing agreement to them. Selection of the service provider is made. In case 
of in-house outsourcing, then the project manager forwards legal documents to the entity 
representative who signs them. Also, the project manager creates the initial value realisation 
measurement plan which estimates the financial outcome and lists the key employees related 
to the outsourcing. Also, the previously created documents are updated. 
Implementation is the fourth phase during which the outsourcing agreement is signed, and 
the overall outsourcing process is implemented. This phase has been used in the analysis 
part of the thesis to conduct the information security risk assessment using ISSRM and 
BNBAG methods. The reason is that it has various information system components repre-
sented and is important in the context of outsourcing. It is divided into sub-processes that 
are described in Section 3.5. 
Managing, Follow-up & Reporting is the last phase of outsourcing. It describes the after 
actions and follow-up activities when the outsourcing agreement has been signed and the 
chosen service provider has started providing the required services and solutions for the 
outsourcing entity. The project manager monitors the financial outcomes and documents 
relevant feedback, updates value realisation and creates key learnings. The contract owner 
monitors contract fulfilment and the performance of the service provider. Also, the contract 
owner is responsible for monitoring risk management & mitigation and internal exit and 
business continuity management plan. The contract owner has to evaluate the economic 
viability of the service provider. The register owner compiles outsourcing reports at least 
yearly to follow-up on contract fulfilment, service provider’s financial status, critical inci-
dents, risks, and related action plans. These reports are stored in a document database which 
is accessible for the authorized parties. There five phases together form the outsourcing 
business process.  
3.5 Assets	in	Outsourcing	System	
The system components of outsourcing have been introduced in Section 3.2 and an overview 
of the phases of outsourcing has been described in Section 3.4. For further discussion, only 
the fourth phase – implementation – is considered in the analysis. It represents important 
internal and external communicating parties, infrastructure needs for communication and 
storage, and information that flows through the system. 
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The upcoming implementation phase process description is based on the financial institu-
tion’s internal handbook of outsourcing. The accuracy of the information flow, communi-
cating parties, the information system, and business assets has been verified by the respon-
sible person from the financial institution. The business process modelling notation (BPMN) 
based process graphs have been compiled by the author. Open software, draw.io, has been 
used to model the business processes. To make the analysis easier to follow, the implemen-
tation has been divided into four phases which order is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Implementation phases 
The first phase, the outsourcing agreement signing, is detailed in Figure 7. and Figure 8. 
The following steps describe the business process of outsourcing agreement signing by the 
project manager, described in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Outsourcing agreement signed by project manager 
Project manager (PM) signs outsourcing agreement and project manager opens email ser-
vice. Email service receives a request and authenticates the user. If credentials are valid, 
then emails will be displayed. If credentials are not valid, then access to email service will 
not be granted. Project manager creates an email with the outsourcing agreement (PM 
signed). Email service sends the email with outsourcing agreement (PM signed) to the ser-
vice provider. 
The following steps describe the flow of the outsourcing agreement, signed by both parties, 
back to the project manager. It is illustrated in Figure 8. Email service receives the email 
with outsourcing agreement (signed), stores it and notifies email recipient. Project manager 
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receives notification and opens email service. Email service receives a request and authen-
ticates the user. If credentials are valid, then a download of the email will be allowed. If 
credentials are not valid, then a download of the email will not be allowed. Project manager 
downloads email with outsourcing agreement (signed). Outsourcing agreement is signed by 
both parties. 
 
Figure 8. Outsourcing agreement signed by both parties 
The second phase of implementation is outsourcing agreement storing which is presented in 
Figure 9. An email sending process is the same, therefore, it is not illustrated in the figure. 
The following steps describe the outsourcing agreement storing.  
Contract owner receives an email with outsourcing agreement (signed) and support mate-
rials. Contract owner opens the contract management system. The contract management 
system receives an access request and authenticates the user. If credentials are valid, then 
permissions to access system will be checked. If credentials are not valid, then contract man-
agement system logs failed login attempt. If permissions are valid, then access will be 
granted. If permissions are not valid, then access will not be granted. Contract owner inputs 
outsourcing agreement (signed) to the contract management system. The contract manage-
ment system receives a request and validates user input. If the user input is valid, then out-
sourcing agreement (signed) will be processed. If the user input is not valid, the process 
stops. Contract management system stores outsourcing agreement (signed) and notifies con-
tract owner. Contract owner receives a notification. 
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Figure 9. Outsourcing agreement storing
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Contract owner opens the common database. The common database receives an access re-
quest and authenticates the user. If credentials are valid, then permissions to access system 
will be checked. If credentials are not valid, then contract management system logs failed 
login attempt. If permissions are valid, then access will be granted. If permissions are not 
valid, then access will not be granted. Contract owner inputs support materials. The com-
mon database receives a request and validates the user input. If the user input is valid, then 
support materials will be processed. If the user input is not valid, the process stops. The 
common database stores support materials and notifies contract owner. Contract owner re-
ceives notification. Outsourcing agreement (signed) and support materials are stored. 
The third phase of implementation is FSA notification phase, which is illustrated in Figure 
10. and the following steps are taken to complete the phase. Compliance representative signs 
FSA application and opens email service. Email service receives a request and authenticates 
the user. If credentials are valid, then emails will be displayed. If credentials are not valid, 
then access to email service will not be granted. Compliance representative creates an email 
with FSA application (signed). Email service sends the email with FSA application (signed). 
FSA is notified. 
 
Figure 10. FSA notification 
The fourth phase of implementation is testing and implementation, which is illustrated in 
Figure 11., to give a complete overview of the business process of implementation. The 
financial institution’s outsourcing handbook has not covered it in detail; hence, it is 
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presented here simply as tasks that the project manager is responsible for conducting. During 
this phase, the project manager is responsible for the following ensuring that applications 
are tested in a production environment. (S)he executes the implementation of the outsourc-
ing scope and updates the value realisation measurement plan. 
 
Figure 11. Testing and implementation 
These four phases form the implementation phase of outsourcing. In this chapter, the out-
sourcing business process has been introduced. The described business process will be used 
in the upcoming chapters. 
3.6 Chapter	Summary	
The chapter has given a description of the case study. An overview of outsourcing in the 
context of the financial institution has been given, emphasizing the opportunities and risks 
that characterize outsourcing. Third-party outsourcing has been marked as one of the top 
challenges in the financial sector.  
The outsourcing system and its components have been introduced in the context of the fi-
nancial institution. The overall outsourcing process has been described. It consists of the 
following five stages: opportunity identification, pre-study, design and planning, implemen-
tation, and managing, follow-up, and reporting. To narrow the scope of risk assessment, the 
implementation stage has been chosen for further analysis as it represents both internal and 
external communicating parties, information systems that are used to exchange information 
and store it. The process has been divided into four phases: outsourcing agreement signing, 
outsourcing agreement storing, FSA notification, and testing and implementation. These 
processes have been illustrated using BPMN modelling language. 
The description and visualization of the phases of implementation have been used to identify 
the business and information system assets which are relevant for assessing information 
security risk in the following chapter. 
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4 Information	Security	Risk	Assessment	Using	ISSRM	
The upcoming chapter follows the ISSRM domain model, illustrated in Figure 1., to identify 
information security risk scenarios in the implementation phase of outsourcing. Information 
security risk assessment process starts with identifying the business and information system 
assets. From this implementation use case, the system assets that support the business assets 
are the following: 
1. Internal parties:  project manager, contract owner, compliance representative. 
2. External parties: service provider, FSA. 
3. Infrastructure and services: email service 
4. Applications/components to support activities: Contract management system, Com-
mon database, Email storage, Contract database, Document database. 
The main business assets in the implementation phase are the following: 
1. Outsourcing agreement 
2. Support materials 
3. FSA application 
In this chapter, the threats and vulnerabilities of the information system have been identified. 
Potential risk scenarios have been created using the potential threats that could exploit the 
vulnerabilities leading to an impact on the financial institution. The result of the information 
security risk assessment has been presented as the list of prioritized risk scenarios. 
4.1 Threats	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	ISSRM	
According to the ISSRM domain model, illustrated in Figure 1., a threat is a threat agent 
who uses an attack method to exploit a vulnerability of the information system asset. Ac-
cording to the ENISA report [38] and the information from the financial institution, the 
dominating adversarial threat agents are criminal groups and nation states. Accidental threat 
agent could be an internal employee either with privileged access to systems or without any. 
Also, an accidental threat agent could be an employee of a partner or vendor with access to 
systems or data. 
According to the research by ENISA and Europol [38] [39] and the information from the 
financial institution, the following attack methods are most commonly used by the threat 
agents. Spreading malware is the leading attack method in all industries. What is more fi-
nancial sector-specific malware, is the high number of reported banking Trojans and ran-
somware Trojans. Also, the number of attack methods using social engineering techniques 
have risen and established themselves as effective methods for infecting the information 
systems. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is still aimed for targeting the availability of 
systems. Also, fraud attacks, information thefts and data breaches are notable threats that 
financial institutions face. 
In the implementation phase of outsourcing, all the named threat agents can potentially use 
the described attack methods to exploit one or more vulnerabilities. The selection of a suit-
able attack method has been made depending on the existing vulnerabilities in the system. 
ENISA threat taxonomy [24], described in the theoretical chapter, has been used to classify 
threats. The considered attack vectors fall under the categories of nefarious activity and in-
terception: injection attack, unauthorized access, hijacking, unauthorized use of IS, misuse 
of IS, Phishing, Malicious software, and information gathering. The relevant threat agents 
and common attack methods have been introduced. 
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4.2 Vulnerabilities	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	ISSRM	
An overview of the information flow in the implementation phase of the outsourcing system 
has been introduced. Information is transmitted through information system assets. Follow-
ing the ISSRM domain model, vulnerabilities are the characteristics of the defined infor-
mation system assets which could be exploited by a threat. OWASP Top 10 taxonomy [27] 
has been used to characterize the vulnerabilities. The vulnerability classes in OWASP Top 
10 are reflected in the implementation phase in a way that is presented in Table 5. The reason 
for using OWASP Top 10 has been explained in the theoretical chapter. 
Table 5. Vulnerabilities in implementation phase for ISSRM analysis 
OWASP category Vulnera-
bility ID 
Vulnerability in implementation 
phase 
Targeted infor-
mation system asset 
Injection 
CWE89 
 
Improper neutralization of special 
elements used in an SQL com-
mand in database servers 
Contract manage-
ment system or 
Common database 
Broken authentica-
tion 
CWE287 
 
Improper authentication in Email 
service Email service 
Sensitive data expo-
sure CWE319 
Cleartext transmission of sensitive 
information between user and 
Email service 
Email service  
XXE CWE611 - - 
Broken access con-
trol CWE285 
Improper authorization in data-
bases 
Contract database or 
Document database 
Security misconfig-
uration CWE16 
Lack of appropriate access control 
implementation in databases 
Contract database or 
Document database 
Cross-site scripting CWE79 
Improper neutralization of input 
during web page generation in da-
tabase servers 
Contract manage-
ment system or 
Common database 
Insecure deserializa-
tion CWE502 - - 
Using components 
with known vulnera-
bilities 
CWE937 Existence of known unpatched vulnerabilities in database servers 
Contract manage-
ment system or 
Common database 
Insufficient logging 
and monitoring CWE778 
Insufficient logging of failed login 
attempts in database servers 
Contract manage-
ment system or 
Common database 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on OWASP Top 10 data [40]) 
Notes: 1) the symbol “-“ indicates that these vulnerabilities have not been included in the 
analysis as they are not present in the system. 
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The Table 5. introduces the sample of vulnerabilities as the characteristics of information 
system assets. Depending on the evaluation, there could be additional vulnerabilities found 
in the implementation phase of the outsourcing system.  
4.3 Impact	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	ISSRM	
According to the ISSRM domain model, illustrated in Figure 1., when a threat agent with 
an attack method successfully exploits one or more vulnerabilities in a system, it will lead 
to an impact that harms an asset and negates the security criterion. Table 6. represents eight 
potential risk scenarios of the implementation phase of outsourcing where a threat agent 
with an attack method successfully exploits a vulnerability which leads to an impact. The 
threats have been categorized according to ENISA taxonomy [24], which has been intro-
duced in the theoretical chapter. 
Table 6. Threats, vulnerabilities and impact for ISSRM analysis 
Threat Risk scenario 
In
je
ct
io
n 
at
ta
ck
 
Threat: An attacker with a motivation to read Outsourcing agreement from Contract 
database and Support materials from Common database by sending crafted SQL injec-
tion statements though Contract management system or Common database. 
Attack method: 
1. Access Contract management system or Common database application. 
2. Identify the non-validated user input field. 
3. Send crafted SQL injection statements through the application. 
4. Gain access to data. 
CWE89: Improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command in da-
tabase servers. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
U
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
IS
 
Threat: An attacker with a motivation to gain access to Outsourcing agreement in Email 
server by using keylogger to obtain the user’s password associated with the smartcard 
and stealing the smartcard. 
Attack method:  
1. Use keylogger to obtain password associated with the smartcard of a user. 
2. Steal the smartcard. 
3. Use the stolen smartcard and its password to connect to the network. 
4. Gain access to Email service. 
CWE287: Improper authentication in Email service. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement. 
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Threat: An attacker with a motivation to alter the transported Outsourcing agreement 
by using the same network as the user, sniffing and capturing the session token. 
Attack method:  
1. Use the same network. 
2. Sniff traffic for session token in unencrypted traffic. 
3. Capture the session token. 
4. Alter the transported data. 
CWE319: Cleartext transmission of sensitive information between user and Email ser-
vice. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement. 
U
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Threat: An attacker with a motivation to get Outsourcing agreement and Support mate-
rials from databases by running an arbitrary SQL query on databases without being au-
thorized to do it and receiving Outsourcing agreement and Support materials as the re-
sult of the query. 
Attack method: 
1. Become authenticated user in the system. 
2. Run arbitrary SQL query on Contract database or Common database without 
being authorized to do it. 
3. Receive the result of the query. 
4. Obtain Outsourcing agreement and Support materials from databases. 
CWE285: Improper authorization in databases. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
M
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S 
Threat: An attacker with a motivation to get Outsourcing agreement from Contract da-
tabase and Support materials from Common database by having knowledge about the 
misconfigured databases and misusing the legitimately-assigned access rights.  
Attack method: 
1. Have knowledge about user access rights being misconfigured in Contract da-
tabase or Common database. 
2. Exploit user access rights misconfiguration in Contract database or Common 
database. 
3. Misuse legitimately-assigned access rights to access document in database. 
CWE16: Lack of appropriate access control implementation in databases. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
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Threat: An attacker with a motivation to exfiltrate sensitive information from Contract 
management system and Common database by embedding a malicious script in URL 
and sending it as a phishing email to a target user. 
Attack method:  
1. Craft a malicious script and embed it in HTTP request. 
2. Send phishing email to a user containing the URL. 
3. Receive a response from application after the user has clicked on the malicious 
URL. 
CWE79: Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in database ap-
plications. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Contract management system and Common data-
base. 
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Threat: An attacker with a motivation to read and modify Outsourcing agreement and 
Support materials by crafting a malware to exploit known unpatched vulnerabilities. 
Attack method: 
1. Have knowledge about the unpatched vulnerabilities in Contract management 
system or Common database. 
2. Craft a malware to exploit the vulnerabilities. 
3. Gain access to Contract database or Document database. 
4. Read and modify Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
CWE937: Existence of known unpatched vulnerabilities in database servers. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality and integrity of Outsourcing agreement and Support 
materials. 
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Threat: An attacker with a motivation to gather Outsourcing agreement and Support 
materials by developing attack vectors to target database information without leaving 
any trail for forensic analysis. 
Attack method: 
1. Have knowledge about incomplete recording of events. 
2. Perform unauthorized scanning of information systems. 
3. Develop attack vectors to attack database information without any trail for fo-
rensic analysis. 
4. Gather Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
CWE778: Insufficient logging of failed login attempts in database servers. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement and Support materials. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
These scenarios are based on subjective estimation by the author. Scenario modelling is 
important to illustrate the potential attack vectors that a threat agent could deploy to exploit 
the vulnerabilities in the system leading to a certain impact. 
The architecture and design of the information systems of the financial institution are com-
plex; hence it is difficult to propose potential attack vectors to target vulnerabilities in the 
system. Financial institutions have to be compliant with requirements, e.g. MiFID [36] and 
PSD2 [37]. Targeting the unregulated service provider whose systems are highly integrated 
with the financial institution could result in a greater impact on the financial institution. 
Despite the contrary, the service provider side of the analysis has been left out due to the 
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lack of knowledge of the service provider’s information system architecture, the integration 
between the systems and the information flow. 
4.4 Information	Security	Risks	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	ISSRM	
Risks are important to assess to have the basis for making decisions about possible treatment 
options or controls selection. Financial sector institutions are obligated to assess their risks 
to be compliant with laws and regulations. According to the ISSRM domain model, risk is 
the combination of a threat event and its caused impact. All the defined scenarios of the 
implementation phase presented in Table 6. are evaluated using ISSRM metrics and the 
results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7. Risk level for ISSRM analysis 
Threat  Business asset Risk description 
Injection attack Outsourcing 
agreement and 
Support mate-
rials 
An attacker with a motivation to read Outsourcing agree-
ment from Contract database and Support materials from 
Common database by sending crafted SQL injection state-
ments though Contract management system or Common da-
tabase due to improper neutralization of special elements 
used in an SQL command in database servers lead to loss of 
confidentiality of Outsourcing agreement and Support mate-
rials. 
Business 
asset 
value 
Risk level calculation 
Security 
need 
Threat 
likelihood 
Vulnerabil-
ity level 
Potenti-
ality 
Impact Risk 
level 
3 C 3 3 2.5 4.5 3 13.5 I 2 
A 1 
Unauthorized 
access to IS 
3 3 1 2 2 3 6 
Hijacking 3 3 2 2.5 3.5 3 10.5 
Unauthorized 
use of software 
3 3 2 2 3 3 9 
Misuse of IS 3 3 2 3 4 3 12 
Phishing 3 3 3 3 5 3 15 
Malicious  
software 
3 3 3 3.5 4.5 3 13.5 
Information 
gathering 
3 3 2 2 3 3 9 
Source: Compiled by the author (using ISSRM metrics [8]) 
There are seven metrics that are defined to calculate the risk level of a threat successfully 
exploiting one or more vulnerabilities leading to an impact on the organization. The security 
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need is evaluated as high level of need for confidentiality or integrity or available for all 
business assets, which also indicates that the impact is evaluated to be with the same value 
following the calculation rules of the ISSRM method. Threat likelihood is based on the sub-
jective judgement about the attacker’s motivation and the sophistication level of the attack. 
The vulnerability level is evaluated as the average of the prevalence value and detectability 
value of the vulnerability based on OWASP evaluation [27]. Other metrics are calculated 
using the equations introduced in the theoretical chapter of the thesis. 
These risk scenarios can be prioritized according to their risk level which indicates the crit-
icality level of the risk for the organization and business asset value. As can be seen, the 
business asset value is considered to be high in all risk scenarios. Also, there are a number 
of attacks which are calculated to have the same risk level. Hence, the decision to start risk 
treatment from the most critical one is difficult. However, risks can be prioritized into the 
following list based on the risk level in Table 7.: 
1. Phishing 
2. Injection attack, Malicious software 
3. Misuse of information system 
4. Hijacking 
5. Unauthorized use of software, Information gathering 
6. Unauthorized access to information systems 
The topic of the thesis is information security risk assessment which consists of identifying, 
analysing and evaluating the risks. ISSRM is a risk management method which includes 
risk treatment and controls as part of the whole process. Following the illustration of ISSRM 
process, the risk assessment process consists of (a) context and asset identification, (b) se-
curity objectives determination, and (c) risk analysis and assessment. Hence, the other parts 
of ISSRM are not analysed due to the limited scope of the research work. 
4.5 Chapter	Summary	
An overview of information security risk assessment using ISSRM method has been given 
in this chapter. Firstly, the relevant assets of the implementation phase of outsourcing have 
been introduced. Both the business assets as well as the supporting information system as-
sets have been listed. The potential threats which are described as a threat agent with an 
attack method have been described. ENISA threat taxonomy [24] has been used to make the 
threat analysis consistent with existing practises of the financial institution. As the following 
step, the vulnerabilities which are the characteristics of the information system assets have 
been identified. OWASP Top 10 vulnerability taxonomy [27] has been used because it has 
been used in the financial institution before. After the vulnerabilities and threats have been 
described, eight risk scenarios have been represented adding the potential impact on the 
organization. The risk assessment results have been presented in Table 7. The scenarios 
have been prioritized according to the risk level which has been calculated using the ISSRM 
metrics. Overall, an illustration of how risk assessment can be done on the implementation 
phase with ISSRM method has been included in this chapter. 
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5 Information	Security	Risk	Assessment	Using	BNBAG	
The BNBAG method [9] [10] is a probabilistic risk assessment method. It has been intro-
duced in Section 2.3. The next sections follow the steps of  BNBAG process shown in Figure 
4: (i) identifying the vulnerabilities of the outsourcing system; (ii) illustrating the depend-
encies between vulnerabilities; (iii) calculating the NPTs, and (iv) evaluation of attack prob-
ability. 
5.1 Identification	of	Vulnerabilities	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	BNBAG	
The BNBAG method [9] [10] is a vulnerability-related risk assessment method. Vulnerabil-
ities are the weaknesses in the system that can be exploited by an adversary. A sample of 
vulnerabilities that have been used in ISSRM have been chosen for BNBAG analysis: Im-
proper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command (CWE89), improper 
authentication (CWE287), cleartext transmission of sensitive information (CWE319), bro-
ken authorization (CWE285), misconfiguration of access controls (CWE16), improper neu-
tralization of input during web page generation (CWE79), existence of known unpatched 
vulnerabilities (CWE937), and insufficient logging of failed login attempts (CWE778). 
Overview of the data is presented in Appendix I. All of them can be found in the implemen-
tation phase of the outsourcing system. Additional information about the vulnerabilities is 
available on the MITRE CWE webpage [41].  
BNBAG method enables modelling dependencies between vulnerabilities. While many dif-
ferent dependencies can be present in the system, the following limited list of dependences 
have been chosen for current example analysis: 
1. CWE287 and CWE89 – improper authentication can depend on a successful exploit 
of SQL injection vulnerabilities [42]. 
2. CWE285 and CWE16 – improper authorization can depend on misconfiguration of 
access controls implemented in IS. 
In the analysis, the probability of a successful attack by an exploit of independent vulnera-
bility is defined as the product of the probability of finding the vulnerability in the system 
and the likelihood of its exploit. Publicly available data provided by the OWASP Project 
[40] is used in the analysis for the average estimation of the probability of finding the vul-
nerability in the system. The description of the data is presented in Appendix I and Appendix 
II. CWE list is used to estimate the likelihood of the exploit of a vulnerability [41]. CWE list 
describes the likelihood of exploit using low/medium/high, which match the numbers 
0.2/0.6/1.0. It has been added to the data presented in Appendix I.  
5.2 Attack	Graph	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	BNBAG	
The selection of identified vulnerabilities and their dependences, as described in Section 5.1 
are used to build an example attack graph shown in Figure 12.1 The attack graph is an illus-
trative example, which enables to demonstrate how dependencies between vulnerabilities 
can be modelled during risk assessment. 
In the following analysis, an incident is defined as the potential compromise of confidenti-
ality, integrity, or availability, which is a common definition of an information security in-
cident in the financial industry. An incident in BNBAG method is an event in ISSRM 
method. Attack graph in Figure 12. shows all considered attack vectors, which can be used 
to cause an incident. Firstly, the vulnerabilities can be targeted independently for a 
                                               
1 It is done in RStudio using R which script has been added in Appendix III. 
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successful incident to occur. Secondly, the exploit of one vulnerability can increase the 
probability of exploit of another vulnerability with dependency, meaning that the second 
vulnerability’s potential exploit depends on the success of the previous one. This situation 
is illustrated with dependence between vulnerabilities CWE285 and CWE16, and depend-
ence between vulnerabilities CWE287 with CWE89.  
 
Figure 12. Attack graph modelling a set of selected vulnerabilities for BNBAG analysis 
It is possible to target vulnerabilities independently. Also, it is possible to use an attack 
vector which successfully exploits one vulnerability node enabling the attacker to exploit 
also the dependent vulnerability. In Section 5.3, node probability tables are formed to illus-
trate the calculation of the joint probability of an incident, taking into consideration the de-
pendencies between different vulnerability nodes. 
5.3 Node	Probability	Tables	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	BNBAG	
NPTs provide input for computing the overall probability of a successful incident. NPTs for 
independent and dependent vulnerabilities are presented in Table 8. The true (T) value rep-
resents the probability of an occurrence of an exploit of a certain vulnerability. It is calcu-
lated as the probability of the vulnerability being present in the system multiplied with its 
likelihood of exploit. The false (F) value represents the probability of non-occurrence of 
such event. As the probability of the false (F) value represents the probability of the com-
plement of occurrence, then it is calculated as one minus the probability of the occurrence 
of an exploit. 
NPTs for all of the identified vulnerabilities are provided in Table 8. including the condi-
tional probabilities of the vulnerabilities CWE285 and CWE287. The probabilities of 
CWE285 and CWE287 indicate their potential dependence on the existence of vulnerabili-
ties CWE16 or CWE89 in the system. Firstly, NPT for CWE285 given CWE16 indicates 
that the probability of CWE285 is true given that CWE16 is true with a value of 0.15 based 
CWE16
CWE285
CWE287
CWE319
CWE778
CWE79
CWE89
CWE937
Incident
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on subjective input. This means that if the access controls have been misconfigured, then 
there is a probability that the user is improperly authorized. The probability that CWE is 
true given that CWE16 is false is 0.02, i.e. the independent probability of CWE285 which 
is calculated from data. Secondly, NPT for CWE287 given CWE89 is represented. The 
probability that CWE287 is true given that CWE89 is true is 0.09. This value is based on 
subjective input. The probability that CWE287 is true given that CWE89 is false is 0.04, i.e. 
the independent probability of the vulnerability CWE287. 
Table 8. NPTs of vulnerabilities for BNBAG analysis 
 NPT CWE16  NPT CWE89  NPT CWE319 
 T 0.24  T 0.10  T 0.05 
 F 0.76  F 0.90  F 0.95 
         
 NPT CWE79  NPT CWE937  NPT CWE778 
 T 0.24  T 0.01  T 0.00(1) 
 F 0.76  F 0.99  F 0.99(9) 
         
NPT CWE16 
 
NPT CWE89 
CWE285 T F 
 
CWE287 T F 
T 0.15 0.02 
 
T 0.09     0.04 
F 0.85 0.98 
 
F 0.91 0.96 
 Source: Compiled by the author (based on OWASP data [40] and MITRE evaluation [41]) 
Node probabilities of dependent variables are calculated using Equation 4. for prior mar-
ginal probability calculation. Firstly, CWE285 is dependent on CWE16 as shown by the 
attack graph in Figure 12. The probability of a successful attack via vulnerability CWE285 
is computed for CWE16 being either true or false. 
• !(#$%285 = *) = ∑ !(#$%285 = *-./01 |#$%16)!(#$%16) = 0.15 × 0.24 +0.02 × 0.76 = 0.05 
Secondly, CWE287 is dependent on CWE89 according to the attack graph. NPT of the vul-
nerability CWE287 is calculated using the Equation 4. The probability of CWE287 is true 
given CWE89 is true or false. 
• !(#$%287 = *) = ∑ !(#$%287 = *|#$%89)!(#$%89) = 0.09 × 0.1 +	-./=>0.04 × 0.9 = 0.05 
The value 0.05 as the result of both equations indicates that there is a 5% chance that 
CWE285 is true and there is a 5% chance that CWE287 in true. 
The values of NPTs for CWE285 and CWE287 presented in the table take into account that 
if vulnerability CWE16 or vulnerability CWE89 have been exploited, then the dependent 
probabilities of CWE285 or CWE287 need to be revised. The belief about the probability 
of CWE285 or CWE287 could be revised using the Bayes’ theorem in Equation 3.  
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The same applies, if it is observed that the vulnerability CWE285 or CWE287 has been 
exploited, then the belief about the probability of CWE16 or CWE89 could be revised using 
the Bayes’ theorem. If it is known that the vulnerability CWE285 is true, it potentially leads 
to an increased probability that CWE16 is true. The posterior probability of CWE16 can be 
calculated with Equation 3. As the result of the calculation is not used in the upcoming 
analysis, this information has only been presented to illustrate the potential use of Bayes’ 
theorem. The same analysis can be conducted if the vulnerability CWE287 is observed to 
be exploited. If relevant data is gathered, the probabilities can be updated according to the 
same theorem. The calculated probabilities can be used to reason about the risk. These six 
NPTs are used to form the result of the BNBAG analysis in the next chapter. 
5.4 Reasoning	and	Calculation	in	Outsourcing	System	Using	BNBAG	
The probabilities of the vulnerabilities found in the system have been calculated in the pre-
vious section. An incident can potentially occur if at least one vulnerability is successfully 
exploited. If two or more vulnerabilities are exploited, the probability of an incident is the 
sum of the probabilities of vulnerabilities described in Equation 9. To calculate the proba-
bility of an incident, the NPTs of the vulnerabilities have to be used. 
There are 6 vulnerabilities illustrated in the attack graph. This means that there are 64 com-
binations of the vulnerabilities that could potentially lead to a successful incident. To give 
an overview of the results, two probabilities have been calculated. The probability of an 
incident is the probability that at least one vulnerability becomes exploited. The first prob-
ability of an incident has been calculated using vulnerabilities as independent events. The 
second probability of an incident considers also the conditioned probabilities in the calcula-
tion. 
1. !(?@A?BC@D) = 1 − ∏!(GHI@CJKL?I?D?CM = N) = 0.54 
2. !(?@A?BC@D) = 1 − ∏!(GHI@CJKL?I?D?CM = N) = 0.56 
The results are different from each other. If no dependencies have been considered, the 
probability of an incident is 0.54. If the dependencies between vulnerabilities have been 
considered, the probability of an incident is 0.56.  
The vulnerabilities can be categorized according to their severity which is defined as the 
probability of the vulnerability existing in the system and the likelihood of its exploit. The 
following list represents the vulnerabilities according to their severity: 
1. CWE16 Security misconfiguration 
2. CWE79 Cross-site scripting 
3. CWE89 SQL injection 
4. CWE319 Cleartext transmission of sensitive information 
5. CWE287 Improper authentication 
6. CWE285 Improper authorization 
7. CWE937 Using component with known vulnerabilities 
8. CWE778 Insufficient security logging 
In conclusion, BNBAG method can be used to evaluate information security risks. An illus-
tration of the process has been shown in the chapter.  
5.5 Chapter	Summary	
An overview of likelihood estimation within information security risk assessment using 
BNBAG method has been given in this chapter. Firstly, the relevant vulnerabilities of the 
implementation phase of the outsourcing system have been identified. OWASP Top 10 
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vulnerability taxonomy has been applied in the analysis, as it has been used in the financial 
institution before. The dependencies between the vulnerabilities have been defined and il-
lustrated in the attack graph. To calculate the node probability tables of the assessed vulner-
abilities, OWASP Top 10 data from the official repository has been used. The description 
of the data is given in Appendix I and Appendix II. The result of the risk likelihood estima-
tion using BNBAG has been calculated, indicating the probability of an incident in the sys-
tem. Overall, an illustration of how to consider correlated vulnerabilities within information 
security risk assessment using BNBAG method has been included in this chapter. 
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6 Discussion	
To answer the research question, firstly, a security risk management method and a proba-
bilistic risk assessment method have been compared, mapping their similarities and differ-
ences of domain models, metrics and processes. Thereafter, the methods have been applied 
to assess risks in the implementation phase of outsourcing to understand their similarities 
and differences in practice. In this chapter, a comparison of the results and observations of 
the two methods are presented. Description of how to combine the methods is shown. Feed-
back and validation of the results of the risk assessments and the list of steps to combine are 
given by the experts from the financial institution. Additionally, the limitations of the cur-
rent study are added. 
6.1 Comparison	of	ISSRM	and	BNBAG	Methods	
There are aspects to consider while choosing a risk assessment method. The decision needs 
to be made following the criteria that an organization has determined. In the following par-
agraphs, a comparison of ISSRM method and BNBAG method is presented, based on the 
case study experience of the author. The following characteristics of methods are consid-
ered: comprehensiveness, input, metrics, result, data related aspects, and resource related 
aspects. 
The comprehensiveness of ISSRM method and BNBAG method is different. ISSRM 
method offers the user the opportunity to assess information security risk considering a 
number of domains, incl. assets, threats, vulnerabilities, impact, risk treatment and control. 
BNBAG method focuses only on the vulnerabilities of the information system. It is possible 
to combine ISSRM method and BNBAG method. This combination of methods can improve 
the overall assessment of information security risks. The list of recommendations, how to 
do it, has been presented in Section 6.2. 
The two methods use different input to conduct the analysis. ISSRM method is based on the 
subjective input from the experts, who help to define relevant assets, threats and vulnerabil-
ities. BNBAG method uses probabilistic values, which can be collected from the experts or 
calculated form data. The input values are needed to evaluate or calculate the probability of 
the vulnerability being present in the system and its likelihood of exploit. 
ISSRM method proposes a number of metrics to calculate the results. In five cases, the met-
rics take the value of a number, based on expert opinion. The potentiality metric and risk 
level has been calculated from the input data of the expert. The logic behind the calculation 
of metrics within ISSRM method is not always transparent. Nonetheless, the calculations 
are easy given the input and using the proposed equations. BNBAG method uses Bayesian 
probability equations to calculate the needed probabilities. Calculation of explicit probabil-
ities requires high maturity of understanding of business processes, vulnerabilities and sys-
tems from an organization. Therefore, its application makes sense only in case of sufficient 
maturity level within the organization. BNBAG application also requires basic quantitative 
skills from risk analysts, who are implementing the method.  
ISSRM method defines risk as a threat exploiting a vulnerability leading to a potential im-
pact for the organization. BNBAG addresses probability of one or many vulnerabilities be-
ing exploited leading to one or more incidents, which provides a part of overall risk assess-
ment. Due to the different scope, the results need to be interpreted differently. ISSRM 
method uses scenarios to model risks. It represents a list of prioritized risk scenarios as the 
result. BNBAG method enables dependencies between vulnerabilities to be taken into ac-
count during risk estimation. It represents the probability of an incident using independent 
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vulnerabilities or dependent vulnerabilities. Also, it results as a list of vulnerabilities accord-
ing to their severity considering their prevalence in the system and likelihood of exploit. 
There are some data-related aspects to consider while comparing the methods. Firstly, data 
accessibility is different between the two methods. ISSRM method uses expert opinions as 
input to the analysis. Although the success of the assessment depends on good communica-
tion between the experts, it is a rather simple technique. BNBAG method uses either expert 
opinions or gathered data as input to the analysis. Defining the relevant data and gathering 
it is more challenging than using expert opinion. 
Secondly, data reliability aspect is different between the two methods. Theoretically, the 
most reliable source is measured data, followed by data, which is calculated, and the least 
reliable is data which is based on qualitative estimates. This means that if data in BNBAG 
analysis is measured, then the results will be more reliable than the results of ISSRM, which 
are based on qualitatively estimated data. 
There are resource-related aspects to consider while comparing the methods. There are dif-
ferences in the scope of preliminary work needed to start with risk assessment. ISSRM uses 
experts as their input for the analysis, therefore no preliminary work is needed. Experts 
gather their knowledge during everyday life and no extra work is needed before starting the 
risk assessment process. If quantitative data is used in BNBAG analysis, then the data re-
quirements have to be determined, a script for processing it has to be developed and quality 
checks have to be done. Preliminary work is needed to start assessing risks with BNBAG. 
The other resource-related aspect is the need for experts, who have knowledge about the 
subject. Successful risk assessment relies on their input and effort to conduct it. The cost of 
hiring experts or using consulting companies can be used to measure the cost. The expert 
input is needed every time when risks are assessed with ISSRM method. BNBAG method 
also requires experts, who have expertise in both information security and data analysis and 
statistics. It could be possible to automate parts of the assessment process if the data analysis 
software is capable of incorporating new data and developing the structure of the network 
based on gathered data. Also, if the algorithms are capable of learning information from 
data, then it would also enable process automation. 
These are a selection of criteria that an organization should consider. An organization has 
to define its requirements that have to be satisfied with the risk assessment method. The 
requirements depend on the regulatory landscape, the maturity level of the organization, 
budgeting decisions, and many other factors.  
6.2 Towards	Combination	of	Methods	
To answer the research question, how to combine a security risk management method and 
a probabilistic risk assessment method, the following process has been proposed. The com-
prehensiveness of ISSRM method and BNBAG method is different. ISSRM method incor-
porates a number of domains that can be considered in risk assessment. However, the 
method uses estimated data as input which makes the results less reliable. BNBAG method 
is a limited method, focusing only on the assessment of vulnerabilities. Yet, measured data 
can be used an input to the analysis, which makes the results more reliable. It has been 
suggested by the author to combine ISSRM method and BNBAG method to provide en-
hancements to assessing information security risks. 
In the following Figure 13., the process of assessing information security risk using the 
combination of a security risk management method and a probabilistic risk assessment 
method has been illustrated. 
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Figure 13. Process of combining a security risk management method and a probabilistic 
risk assessment method 
1.	Context	and
assets	identification
2.	Security
objectives
identification
								(b)	model	the	process	under	assessment;
								(c)	identify	business	and	IS	assets;
								(d)	define	the	security	need	of	business	assets;
3.	Threat	analysis
4.	Vulnerability
analysis
5.	Threat	event	and
impact	analysis
6.	Risk	evaluation
								(e)	define	the	relevant	threat	agents;
								(f	)	define	the	attack	methods;
								(g)	define	the	likelihood	of	a	threat	considering	the	threat	agents	
													and	their	attack	methods;
								(h)	gather	data	about	the	prevalence	of	vulnerabilities;
								(i)	define	the	context	related	vulnerabilities	of	IS	assets;
								(j	)	gather	data	about	the	dependencies	of	the	scoped	vulnerabilities;
								(k)	list	the	dependencies	between	scoped	vulnerabilities;
								(l	)	visualize	the	dependencies	on	an	attack	graph;
							(m)	gather	data	about	their	exploitability;
								(n)	calculate	the	probabilities	of	independent	vulnerabilities;
								(o)	calculate	the	marginal	probabilities	of	dependent	vulnerabilities;
								(p)	update	the	posterior	probabilities	if	new	data	is	gathered;
								
								(q)	describe	scenarios	based	on	threats	and	vulnerabilities;
								(r	)	calculate	the	potentiality	of	risk	events	using	the	likelihood	of	a	threat
													and	the	probability	of	the	vulnerability;	
								(s)	consider	the	potential	impact	of	the	scenarios	in	terms	of	
													the	negation	of	security	criterion;
								(t	)	define	the	value	of	impact;
								
								(u)	calculate	the	risk	level	for	each	scenario;
								(v)	prioritize	the	scenarios	based	on	the	calculated	risk	level.
		before:	(a)	gather	experts	and	stakeholders;
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To start with, (a) experts and relevant stakeholders have to be engaged into the risk assess-
ment process. Firstly, their input is needed to (b) model the process under assessment. For 
example, BPMN language can be used to visualize the process. As a result of the process 
modelling, (c) business assets and their supporting IS assets are identified.  
Secondly, the (d) security need of the business assets have to be defined. Information secu-
rity need is usually determined using confidentiality, integrity, or availability as the objec-
tives. However, other objectives that characterize the process can be used, e.g. non-repudi-
ation, accountability, authenticity.  
Thirdly, threats have to be analysed. The relevant (e) threat agents and their (f) attack meth-
ods have to be defined. It is possible to use threat landscape reports, e.g. ENISA Threat 
Landscape Report [38] or Europol Report [39], which give an overview of the most popular 
threat agents and attack methods. Also, there are threat taxonomies available for use, e.g. 
MITRE’s ATT&CK taxonomy [22], Threat Agent Library by Intel Corporation [23], 
ENISA taxonomy [24]. The (g) likelihood of a threat for the organization has to be meas-
ured. It is difficult to measure the likelihood of a threat. Expert input is needed to define the 
value between zero and one, where zero indicates that there is no threat at all, and one indi-
cates that there is a definite threat for the organization. Such evaluation is needed in further 
analysis. 
The next phase is about vulnerability analysis. There are vulnerability taxonomies, e.g. 
OWASP Top 10 [27], Seven Pernicious Kingdoms [43], Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures [25], and it is possible to use a probabilistic assessment method. The key question 
is whether the organization is capable of gathering the relevant data. (h) Data about the 
prevalence of the vulnerabilities have to be gathered. Vulnerability scanning tools, e.g. Nes-
sus tools [44], OpenVAS [45], can be used to gather information. The (i) context related 
vulnerabilities and their prevalence have to be defined. Prevalence is the quantity of the 
certain vulnerability found in tested network and applications. (j) Data about the dependen-
cies between the vulnerabilities have to be found. It is possible to use expert knowledge or 
advanced algorithms, e.g. constraint-based algorithms based on inductive causation [46], or 
score-based algorithms [47], to find the dependencies. The potential (k) dependencies be-
tween vulnerabilities have to be defined and (l) visualized on an attack graph. It is possible 
to use RStudio and write an R script to plot the attack graph based on the defined vulnera-
bilities and their dependencies between each other. (m) Data about the likelihood of exploit 
of each vulnerability has to be gathered. It is possible to use expert knowledge to gather 
such data. The (n) probability of a vulnerability is the probability of prevalence multiplied 
with the likelihood of exploit. The (o) probabilities of dependent vulnerabilities are the mar-
ginal probabilities of the vulnerabilities. It is possible to (p) update the posterior probabilities 
using the Bayes’ theorem if new data is gathered. The values are between zero and one. 
The following phase is about threat events which lead to an impact. (q) Scenario-based threat 
modelling can be used. The scenarios should consider a potential threat agent with an attack 
method to exploit a vulnerability. The (r) potentiality of a threat event is the product of the 
likelihood of the threat and the probability of the vulnerability. (s) Impact of the threat events 
has to be considered in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the business 
asset. (t) Value of impact has to be defined. 
Risk evaluation is the last phase of risk assessment. The (u) risk level value is the product 
of the potentiality of a threat event and the impact value. The (v) scenarios have to be pri-
oritized according to the calculated risk level. This means that the risk scenario which re-
ceived the highest risk values becomes the first one on the list. The risk scenario which 
received the lowest risk level value becomes the last one on the list. 
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6.3 Feedback	from	the	Financial	Institution	
This section discusses the feedback provided by the financial institution for the thesis. It 
gives a description of the procedure and an overview of the participated experts. The feed-
back is essential to validate the correctness and completeness of the thesis and discuss its 
usefulness for the industry. 
Description of the procedure 
The feedback was asked from the selection of financial institution employees. The decision 
of whom to ask for their input was based on their expertise in risk assessment or outsourcing. 
Each participant holds a non-disclosure agreement with the financial institution. The partic-
ipants were invited via e-mail to participate in the feedback meeting of the thesis. Before-
hand, an overview of the research problem and questions, scope, methodology and contri-
bution were provided for them. The invited experts decided whether to participate in the 
meeting or not. Overall, seven experts joined the meeting via Skype and four experts were 
present in the meeting room. The following areas of experts were present in the meeting: 
operational risk, information security, third-party outsourcing, and procurement. 
The author of the research gave a presentation about the thesis for the audience. The rele-
vance of the topic and the research problem were explained. The research questions, which 
have been proposed in the thesis, were discussed. An overview of the included methods was 
given, emphasizing the differences between the processes, the used metrics and the results. 
Also, the outsourcing process which is the context of the risk assessment was introduced. 
The outsourcing process description had been validated before by the expert of outsourcing 
in the financial institution. The results of the ISSRM method and BNBAG method were 
represented, explained and compared. Finally, the recommended steps for how two combine 
the methods were described. The feedback was given after the end of the presentation and 
additional comments about the correctness and completeness were sent via email. The cita-
tions in the following paragraphs have been taken from the written emails forwarded to the 
author from the experts. 
Validation and discussion 
The participants were asked about the correctness and completeness of the defined problem 
statement, procedure, and results. The problem statement was evaluated to be correctly de-
fined reflecting the challenges that the organization faces in their everyday operations. It 
was emphasized that “organizations struggle with information security risk assessment due 
to its interdisciplinary nature as well as a vague understanding of the specific risks on the 
executive management level”.  Qualitative information risk assessment methods are industry 
best practice. However, “qualitative methods are inefficient in providing a versatile view”. 
Some other areas assess risks using quantitative methods which are reliable as they are based 
on measured data. Therefore, “all efforts towards quantitative risk measurement and assess-
ment methodologies are essential and highly appreciated”. However, the comments sug-
gested that the problem statement was not complete as “outsourcing would have had to be 
considered in the context of a selected critical process, not the risks associated with out-
sourcing process as such”. 
The overall procedure of the thesis was also discussed with the meeting participants. It was 
validated to be complete, understandable and easy to follow. The research paper “follows a 
coherent track from containing a specific example of application to how qualitative and 
quantitative assessment can be recorded and used for it”. Feedback about the conclusions 
and case representation was also given indicating its admissibility in the context of the fi-
nancial institution. However, there was a comment about the correctness of the research 
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procedure as the problem statement has been proposed on a high-level while the methods 
consider a small step in the outsourcing process and make risk estimation at a very detailed 
level. Yet, it was understood that “the full framework for risk aggregation might have been 
too high ambition”.  
The results of the research were also reviewed by experts. The results were considered to be 
correct as of the data, its interpretation and calculations led to clear and understandable re-
sults. It was implied that the results were not complete as “the results of the risk assessment 
methods are only illustrative examples of the usage of methods”. The results of the risk 
assessments do not explicitly describe the situation in the financial institution because in-
dustry-specific data has not been used in the analysis. Yet, “the value of such scope is setting 
a more general basis to support the choice and design of risk assessment methodologies, as 
the principles can be embedded in various process models”. 
Some other discussion points emerged from the meeting session. Feedback about the im-
portance of the partnership between academia and industry in the field of information secu-
rity was pointed out. The financial institution is known for having co-supervised students in 
the areas of economics and finances. Yet, information security-based research done as a 
year-long cooperation is new for the organization. It was highlighted that such “partnership 
between academia and industry is inevitable for moving forward with information security 
risk assessment methods”. The experts acknowledge that “the area is still very much in 
development and out-of-the box solutions have not matured”. 
The meeting also included a discussion about the challenges that an organization should first 
overcome to use a probabilistic risk assessment method. It was noted that the research paper 
highlights the “need of sufficient maturity to assess risks quantitatively”. The prerequisites 
for assessing risks quantitatively or using a combination of a qualitative and quantitative 
method have to be met. The needed data and its gathering process have to be defined. Also, 
“understanding of risks and ownership of data and processes before moving towards ad-
vanced quantitative methods is needed”. 
The topic of outsourcing and its related information security risks was also discussed. The 
importance of understanding the risks related to outsourcing was emphasized. It was re-
marked that organizations still face the challenges of coordination, structured data, and 
optimal risk management processes. This indicates that certain issues have to be settled be-
fore moving forward with the applications of quantitative methods. 
Lastly, the experts suggested further doing the cost analysis, proof-of-concept on aggregated 
risk levels, but also evidence of competence and data quality to enable the combined method 
or alternative methods with similar characteristics. 
6.4 Limitations	of	the	Study	
There are certain limitations to the study. The missing part of the research is the risk assess-
ment of third-party access to the systems of the financial institutions and the integration 
between the systems of the service provider and the financial institution. Threat could have 
modelled by building the attack vectors from the service provider to the financial institution. 
Such analysis would have required detailed knowledge about the vulnerabilities of the in-
formation system assets of the service providers and the volume and level of detail of such 
analysis would have been out of the scope of this thesis.   
The research considers outsourcing as requesting services and solutions from external par-
ties. However, the financial institution uses internal outsourcing, i.e. requiring services or 
solutions produced by another department within the bank, as another option which has not 
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been covered in the thesis. Risk could potentially have different characteristics whether the 
services have been provided by external parties or internal employees. Outsourcing to cloud 
service providers is also not considered in the study, although its importance has increased 
in the last years. The risk scenarios and results could have been different if cloud service 
providers would have been included in the analysis.  
The research paper considers the adversarial threats for the organization. However, acci-
dental threats that are caused by the organization’s own employees have not been analysed. 
Humans can easily make mistakes due to their careless attitude, lack of awareness about the 
issues, or any other personal characteristic. Human aspects of information security risk are 
important to be considered while evaluating the risks. 
Data-related limitations concern the lack of data, use of available data in the analysis, and 
the incorporated expert judgement data. The analysis in this thesis is not performed on spe-
cific data of a single financial institution to allow to make more generic conclusions. Fur-
thermore, the results are not thoroughly financial sector specific, as e.g. other vital service 
providers face very similar challenges to financial sector institutions in terms of assessing 
information security risk. This is both a strength of the work, allowing to draw conclusions, 
which can be used in many different frameworks, but also a weakness, as the author cannot 
conclude step-by-step proof-of-concept based on a specific example. These limitations 
should be taken into consideration to improve the research in the future.  
6.5 Chapter	Summary	
This chapter summarizes the discussion about the results of the thesis. Firstly, a comparison 
has been included according to the observations made during the risk assessment processes. 
The two methods have been compared in terms of their comprehensiveness, input data, met-
rics and results, other data-related aspects and resource-related aspects. Secondly, an over-
view of the recommended steps on how to combine the methods has been presented in Fig-
ure 13. The description of the steps has been included. Thirdly, a description about the feed-
back from the financial institution has been added, covering the relevance of the topic for 
the sector, feedback on the structure and content of the thesis, and future research sugges-
tions. Finally, the limitations of the scope of current research have been presented. 
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7 Conclusion	
The opportunities that the use of technology and information provides, ensure that private 
individuals, fields of industries, and governments will continue to use them extensively and 
find new advanced ways to integrate them more and more into their everyday operations. If 
there are opportunities, there are also risks. Today, the financial institution uses security risk 
management methods that are qualitative to assess their information security risk. Another 
option would be to assess security risk using a probabilistic method. ISSRM method has 
been chosen to represent a risk management method while BNBAG method serves as a 
probabilistic risk assessment method. The two methods have been applied in a case study to 
grasp their similarities and difference in practice. Outsourcing has been chosen as the con-
text to implement the two methods. Outsourcing is one of the top challenges in the financial 
sector. The results of the two assessments have been presented. Applying the methods to 
assess the information security risk of a real-life process has given the author of the thesis 
an understanding that enhancements in the field are needed. A suggestion on how to com-
bine a security risk management method and a probabilistic method has been given. The 
answers to the research questions have been provided in the following paragraphs. 
Research question 1: What are the assets that need protection?  
The relevant assets that need protection in the context of outsourcing in the financial insti-
tution have been identified. The process of outsourcing has been described and modelled to 
determine the assets. An outsourcing handbook issued by the financial institution has been 
used as the basis for modelling the process. The overall outsourcing process consists of five 
stages represented in Figure 5. To narrow the scope, only the implementation phase has been 
used in risk assessment. The process of implementation includes Outsourcing agreement 
signing, Outsourcing agreement storing, FSA notification and Testing and implementation. 
The BPMN modelling language has been used to identify the assets that need protection in 
the implementation phase of outsourcing. The process models illustrate business and infor-
mation system assets that support business assets. The identified assets have been discussed 
in Section 3.5. The assets that need protection are both the business assets as well as the 
system assets. The business assets need protection as the adversary’s motivation can be ei-
ther to disclose, modify, or disrupt the business asset. The information system assets also 
need protection as they support business assets. The vulnerabilities which are the character-
istics of the information system assets can be exploited by the adversary; thus, additional 
protection of the information system assets is needed. It has been illustrated in the thesis, 
how security risk management method is based on asset-related concepts, i.e. the main focus 
is on identifying and protecting the assets. Assets need to be identified to understand the 
related vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by a threat leading to an impact for the 
organization. 
Research question 2: What is the estimated information security risk? 
Information security risk has been assessed with two methods. ISSRM method describes the 
information security risk as to the combination of a threat exploiting one or more vulnera-
bilities, leading to an impact for the organization. Threat agents and their potential attack 
methods have been described using ENISA taxonomy introduced in Section 2.1. The threats 
are relevant to the implementation phase of the outsourcing process due to the existing vul-
nerabilities in the information system assets. The vulnerabilities have been assessed using 
the OWASP Top 10 taxonomy introduced in Section 2.1. Firstly, risk scenarios have been 
developed where a threat exploits a vulnerability of an information system asset which leads 
to an impact that negates the security criterion. The metrics that are proposed by the ISSRM 
method have been calculated to achieve the result presented as a list of risk levels. The 
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security risk assessed with ISSRM method has been presented in Chapter 4. Secondly, 
BNBAG method has been used to model dependencies between vulnerabilities. The main 
focus has been on identifying the relevant vulnerabilities and the directed dependencies be-
tween them. Again, the vulnerabilities have been assessed using the OWASP Top 10 taxon-
omy. An attack graph made of the vulnerability nodes has been created to illustrate the de-
pendencies between vulnerabilities. The node probability tables for each vulnerability has 
been calculated. The result is the probability of an incident. The security risk assessed with 
BNBAG method has been presented in Chapter 5. 
Research question 3: What is the comparison of the chosen risk assessment methods?  
The comparison between the security risk management method and the probabilistic risk 
assessment method has been described. The comparison has been made based on the sub-
jective observations made during the risk assessment processes. Firstly, the two methods 
have been compared in terms of their comprehensiveness. ISSRM method offers a coherent 
overview of a risk considering asset-related concepts and risk-related concepts as part of the 
assessment process. BNBAG method focuses only on the assessment of vulnerabilities to 
calculate the probability of an incident. Secondly, while ISSRM method uses qualitative 
data as input to the analysis, it is possible to use measured data in BNBAG analysis. The 
calculation of the result is different; hence, the result of the methods is also different. Also, 
the comparison is made in terms of data-related aspects, including data accessibility and 
data reliability. Additionally, the methods have been compared in terms of resource-related 
aspects, such as the scope of preliminary work and the need for experts. The comparison 
between the processes, models, and metrics of the two methods has been presented in Sec-
tion 2.4. The comparison based on the observations made during the risk assessment pro-
cesses has been presented in Section 6.1. 
Research question 4: How can security risk management method and probabilistic risk as-
sessment method be used together? 
It has been suggested by the author of the thesis to combine the security risk management 
method and the probabilistic risk assessment method to improve the results of the risk as-
sessment. It has been recommended to combine the methods using the following stages: 
identification of the assets and the security objectives based on ISSRM method, analysis of 
threats according to ISSRM method, modelling of vulnerabilities based on BNBAG, de-
scription of threat events and the potential impact using ISSRM. The steps have been de-
scribed in Section 6.2. The combined method offers an opportunity to use both expert 
knowledge and quantitative data in the analysis, resulting in a more reliable information 
security risk assessment for the organization.  
There are future research suggestions to be considered. Information security risk assessment 
methods can be improved to start making budgeting decisions based on relevant data, cal-
culations, and reasoning. Although it depends on the maturity level of the organization, 
Bayesian network modelling could be beneficial if it is based on accurate data and validated 
graph visualization. There is further research needed to define the relevant data, the source 
from which the data should be gathered, and the requirements that the data needs to satisfy. 
Also, there is research needed to determine the possibilities of how to form the structure of 
the graph that would describe the gathered data to assess risks. Although there are algorithms 
available for use, the most suitable one should be determined. Also, additional research 
could be made to define Bayesian network-based attack graphs improvement options. It 
could be possible to include decision and utility nodes in the Bayesian network or cost-
benefit analysis. These are the future research suggestions for the financial institution to 
conduct.  
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Appendix	
I. Description	of	Data	
OWASP 
category 
Vulnerability ID Sample 
size 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Likelihood 
of exploit 
Injection SQL Injection CWE89 11929 458,81 976,54 High 
Broken au-
thentication 
Improper Au-
thentication 
CWE287 4258 163,77 486,42 High 
Sensitive 
data expo-
sure 
Cleartext Trans-
mission of Sensi-
tive Information 
CWE319 5782 222,38 690,75 High 
XXE XML External 
Entity Injection 
(XXE) 
CWE611 9658 371,46 1035,29 High 
Broken ac-
cess control 
Improper Author-
ization 
CWE285 2641 101,58 252,03 High 
Security mis-
configuration 
Security Miscon-
figuration 
CWE16 28526 1097,15 3985,01 High 
Cross-site 
scripting 
Cross-Site Script-
ing (XSS) 
CWE79 28503 1096,27 2033,40 High 
Insecure 
deserializa-
tion 
Deserialization of 
Untrusted Data 
CWE502 - - - Medium 
Using com-
ponents with 
known vul-
nerabilities 
Using Compo-
nents with 
Known Vulnera-
bilities 
CWE937 1624 62,46 183,56 Medium 
Insufficient 
logging and 
monitoring 
Insufficient Secu-
rity Logging 
CWE778 446 17,15 71,79 Medium 
Number of tested applications 120847  
Source: Compiled by the author (base on OWASP Top 10 data) 
Note:  the symbol “-“ indicates that there is no data about this vulnerability in database.  
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II. Overview	of	Data	
 
Organization Vulnerabilities 
CWE 
79 
CWE 
16 
CWE 
319 
CWE 
285 
CWE 
937 
CWE 
89 
CWE 
287 
CWE 
778 
CWE 
611 
O1 306 12 135 4 88 54 116 0 0 
O2 2019 4390 3452 68 889 522 216 0 693 
O3 3423 0 81 6 25 1111 0 0 102 
O4 635 355 67 246 36 147 246 0 101 
O5 7513 20059 0 3 0 3896 6 0 4641 
O6 6130 0 0 0 0 2238 21 0 2570 
O7 4501 0 0 0 0 2627 18 0 1303 
O8 336 205 63 57 0 47 289 0 3 
O9 356 356 114 24 356 27 21 0 30 
O10 200 14 149 7 55 9 124 0 0 
O11 1040 400 1020 1100 40 780 400 364 200 
O12 111 0 22 76 111 50 70 0 2 
O13 47 99 115 148 0 17 0 0 0 
O14 147 27 87 144 0 13 155 62 0 
O15 1626 2490 407 727 0 267 2490 7 10 
O16 5 3 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 
O17 2 5 6 3 0 0 3 8 0 
O18 1 7 3 0 7 0 2 0 0 
O19 40 46 46 8 8 8 46 0 3 
O20 25 31 6 6 5 8 22 0 0 
O22 6 4 6 2 1 4 2 0 0 
O23 9 6 0 9 0 10 6 0 0 
O24 22 14 0 0 0 90 1 0 0 
O25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O26 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 5 0 
Source: OWASP Top 10 data [40] 
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III. R	Code	for	Creating	an	Attack	Graph	
# Vulnerability-based attack graph 
library(ggdag) 
dag_vulnerabilities_mt<-dagify(Incident~CWE89+CWE285+CWE319+CWE79, 
Incident~CWE287+CWE16+CWE778+CWE937, 
                                CWE285~CWE16, 
                                CWE287~CWE89) 
 
ggdag(dag_vulnerabilities_mt, node_size=20, text_size = 3, layout="circle") 
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